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Abstract 
This research investigated the effective economic growth determinants using a panel data 
set over the period 1995 to 2010 in oil-rich countries divided by the level of democracy 
into two groups: countries with low and high democracy. The result of OLS method 
rejects the curse hypothesis; however, TSLS method reveals the reserves of oil endowment 
has a negative effect on economic growth of low democracy countries and the curse 
hypothesis is approved. 
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Introduction 
 
Resource curse is one of the most important empirical findings of development economics 
in twentieth century. This hypothesis concerns resource-rich countries which have less 
economic growth in comparison to resource-poor ones. Generally resource curse 
hypothesis is a paradox because natural resources are the primary sources of all 
development routes. They also provide the fastest source of foreign exchange and absorb 
foreign skills and capitals and increase access to raw materials, and will raise the demand 
for manufacturing and industrial products. However, over the past 50 years, natural 
resource-rich countries such as Russia, Nigeria, and Venezuela have experienced much 
slower economic growth than others with fewer natural resources (Auty, 2001) (Rainis, 
1991) (Bulmer, 1994) (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997) (Lal and Myint, 1996). Oil-rich 
countries, rich countries with fertile land and the sea have faced a slow economic growth 
over the last three decades which OPEC countries are the obvious example so that during 
the past four decades, all OPEC countries have experienced negative growth rates 
(Gylfason, 2001) and GDP per capita has decreased by 1.3 percent per year between 1965 
and 1998 in these countries while at the same period GDP per capita has increased by 2.2 
percent for countries with medium and low growth (Gylfason, 2001). Studies have 
confirmed the view that countries that have little oil reserves often have a higher economic 
growth compared to resource-rich countries and in most studies, the negative relationship 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth has been verified. The current 
study sought to examine the relationship between the reserves of oil endowment and 
economic growth in selected oil producing countries with low and high democracy.  
The following parts of paper are as below: theoretical basis for resource curse and 
democracy are represented in second section. Then in third section literature will be 
reviewed. Specification and estimation of the model is presented in fourth part and finally 
section 5 concludes. 
 
Resource curse 
Michael Ross (2012) in his book The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the 
Development of Nations, states although the developing world has been wealthier, more 
democratic and pacifist since 1980, it is just true in countries without oil. Scattered oil 
countries in Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia are not wealthier, more 
democratic and more pacifist than what they were in three decades ago, some even are 
worse. Income per capita has decreased 6 percent in Venezuela, 45 percent in Gabon and 
85 percent in Iraq over 1980 to 2006. A large number of oil producing countries such as 
Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Iraq with several decades of civil war have faced a 
bad situation too. These political and economical chronic diseases create the same thing is 
called Resource Curse. Since these diseases and curses are not made by other natural 
resources like jungles, clean water and fertile land, it is more relevant to say this is a 
mineral curse. Among minerals oil, which contains more than 90 percentage of the world 
trade, causes the largest problems for most countries. Generally resource curse is the oil 
curse. 
   
Resource curse literature investigates the reasons of why countries with these blessings 
fail in economic development and especially in achieving a continuous and proper 
economic growth. Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997), Auty (2001), Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004) presented the first empirical relationship of resource curse hypothesis. In addition 
to calling resource curse as a historical common pattern, they introduced natural resource 
abundance as the most obvious cause of low economic performance.  
 
Democracy 
Barro (1996), Ross (2001) and Polterovich and Popov (2006) state if political institutions 
and political power are in the hands of one person or a small group or even be as 
democratic dictatorship and leaders and legislators to be elected by the public (but not in 
complete freedom), property rights secure and equal opportunities for the people and 
economic institutions can hardly be achieved. Most of the developing oil exporting 
countries are accompanied by poverty, low quality of education and lack of civil society. 
Corruption exists at all levels of social, political, cultural and economic life and increased 
corruption, reduction in the rule of law, the quality of governance declines the economic 
growth. Ross (2001) also states oil wealth may prevent the promotion of democracy and 
the attempts to formation of a democratic government, especially in developing countries 
due to the tendency of powerful leaders to use repressive methods. In this case, the huge 
oil revenues in oil-exporting countries make it possible for political regimes to suppress 
the social objections with more power. Ross suggests that oil wealth with military 
spending in turn is associated with despotism. Wantchekon (1999), Ross (2001) and Smith 
(2004) know the reason behind the lack of democracy in oil-rich countries, firstly the 
tendency of their leaders to be autonomy in decision-making. These countries by relying 
on vast resources do not receive tax thus the leaders considered themselves separate from 
the society and not accountable to the people. Chaudhry (1997) states experience of the tax 
bureaucracy cut in Saudi Arabia and Iran during the Pahlavi regime refers to the 
authoritarian regimes in most Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries and other oil-exporting 
countries. Secondly, government will allocate oil revenues to calm down and suppress 
populations and third, the social structure of these countries is not a good atmosphere for 
democratic regimes. The main question is that why the oil rent increase in political 
systems will affect economic performance? 
 
Literature review 
Many studies have been performed in the area of resource curse. Rocha (2010) states 
Perbish (1950, 1964) and singer (1950) studied the subject firstly. These development 
economists argued raw materials exporters in trade with industrialized countries due to 
deteriorating of terms of trade, would lose their benefits and the economy fell behind in 
development path. Olomola et al. (2003) investigated the effect of oil rent on economic 
growth using a panel data set over 1970 to 2000 in 47 oil exporting countries among the 
African countries. They concluded resource curse does not occur because of Dutch disease 
and effect of exchange rate, but the lack of democracy leads to oil rents and will reduce 
economic growth in these countries. To indicate the relationship, he applied the variables 
   
such as income per capita, ratio of investment to GDP, oil wealth, institutional quality, real 
per capita income, population growth, and the exchange rate. 
Wantchekon (1999) investigated the effect of natural resources on economic growth of 
democratic governments. He revealed when governmental institutions are weak and there 
is a lack of transparency in the budget, oil bonanza caused authoritarianism and increased 
social and political instability. The variables of the research consist of the Gini coefficient, 
the ratio of exports to GDP and the governmental concentration measurement. He refers to 
the failure of democracy in the Middle East and admits that the increased government 
revenues tend to raise their democracy; however, if income is derived from oil wealth, 
democracy reduces or disappears. Romer (1970) and Lewis (1989) emphasize a positive 
relationship between natural resources abundance and economic growth. Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2004) by considering the direct and indirect effects of natural resources 
abundance on economic growth, concluded when natural resources are the single 
explaining variable have a positive effect on economic growth; however, the effect is 
negative when other explaining variables such as corruption, investment, openness to 
trade, terms of trade and education are inserted to the model. Olusi and Olagunju (2005) 
showed the agricultural production and exports of Nigeria have been depressed along with 
the oil boom and higher oil prices over 1980-2003. Brunnschweiler (2006) found out a 
positive and significant relationship between natural resources abundance and economic 
growth. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) in a study for the United States showed that 
resource abundance has a negative and harmful effect on the growth of this country. 
Thereby resources reduce investment, years of schooling, openness to trade and costs of  
R&D and increase corruption in the society. 
Omes and Kalcheva (2007) by examining the Dutch disease hypothesis in Russia and 
using indicators such as strengthening the real exchange rate, reducing the growth of 
manufacturing sector and increasing the service sector indicated rising oil prices in 
addition to increase the exchange rate cause the growth of manufacturing sector and 
employment decrease. 
James and Aadland (2010) investigated resource curse phenomenon in United Stated and 
concluded increased natural resources in different states led to economic slowdown. 
Boyce and HerbertEmery (2011) found a negative relationship between natural resources 
and economic growth. 
According to the literature, we are going to investigate the effect of reserves of oil 
endowment on economic growth along with variables such as population, openness to 
trade, religion, type of government and indicators of economic freedom and breadth of the 
oil-rich countries which are divided by the level of democracy into two groups: democratic 
and non-democratic countries. This division is performed by using Index of Democracy4. 
Democratic countries consist of Full democracies, Flawed democracies, and Hybrid 
regimes and Non-democratic countries include Authoritarian regimes as mentioned in the 
index of democracy. 
 
 
                                                            
4 From The Economist Intelligence Unit (2012) 
   
Table 1. selected countries 
Group Name of countries Period 
Democratic countries Australia, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Britain, America and Venezuela 1995-2010 
Non-democratic 
countries Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, China, Egypt, Gabon, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Syria 1995-2010 
 
These countries have been selected because of the availability of information. 
 
Introducing the variables and specification of the model 
 
Referring to the literature and based on the studies of Olomola et al. (2003) the model is 
specified as following: 
 
ܮܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ൈ ܮܱܲ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߚଶ ൈ ܮܩܱ ௜ܸ௧ ൅ ߚଷ ൈ ܮܨ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ߚସ ൈ ܮܨܨܥ௜௧ ൅ ߚହ ൈ ܮܱܫܮ௜௧
൅ ߚ଺ ൈ ܱܲܮܫܶ ௜ܻ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ ൈ ܮܴܣܶܧ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଼ ൈ ܮܨܨ௜௧ ൅ ߚଽ ൈ ܮܲ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ܦ ௜ܷ௧ ൅ ௜ܷ௧ 
 
We just added the economic freedom indicators in comparison to the model of Olomola et 
al. (2003). The variables and sources of information are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The variables and sources of information 
Variable Description Resource 
LGDP Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product (Constant 2000 US  )$  World Bank (2013) 
LOIL Oil Proved reserves (Million Barrels) OPEC (2013) & BP (2013) 
LPOP Logarithm of population (the number of people) World Bank (2013) 
POLITY 
Polity represent "a particular form or a system of government", defined as the basis 
of regime legitimacy. It ranges from -10 (purely Autocratic) to +10 (purely 
Democratic). Increase in Polity then signifies a more democratic polity and 
decrease for a more autocratic one 
Center for Global polity George 
Mason University (2013) 
LGOV 
Logarithm of the size of government, which belongs to the index of economic 
freedom. It ranges from 0 to 100. Countries with larger governments have lower 
ranks. 
In all indicators of economic freedom, increase in the number indicates more 
economic freedom. 
heritage.org (2013) 
LFT Logarithm of the trade freedom (indicators of economic freedom) heritage.org (2013) 
LFFC Logarithm of the freedom from corruption (indicators of economic freedom) heritage.org (2013) 
LFF Logarithm of the freedom from tax (indicators of economic freedom) heritage.org (2013) 
LPT Logarithm of the property rights (indicators of economic freedom) heritage.org (2013) 
LRATE  Logarithm of the real exchange rate World Bank (2013) 
LGEO Logarithm of the breadth of the country (the area of each country to square meters) World Bank (2013) 
ISLAM Religion as a dummy variable in the model. For Muslim countries it considers 1 and for others 0. United Nations (2013) 
LL  Logarithm of employment World Bank (2013) 
LSCH  Logarithm of the number of enrollees in secondary schools World Bank (2013) 
 
 
Since there is a possibility that a missed effect change the results, a dummy 
variable is added to the model. This variable can represent to some extent the effect 
of rent-seeking and factors like war, religion and security and etc. which are not 
included in the model. The figures zero and one are given to the variable in the 
absence and presence of the missed effect. 
 
 The error term  
 
ߚ1 , ߚ2 , ߚ3 , ߚ4 ,  ߚ5 ,  ߚ6 ,  ߚ7, ߚ8, ߚ9 are the coefficients of the model and should be estimated. 
 
  
   
Stationary test 
Since the period of this research is considered in long term, unit root test is performed. All 
variables are stationary in level except GDP in countries with low democracy and oil 
proved reserves in countries with high democracy. Thus the first difference of I(1) 
variables entered to the model and hence the cointegration test is not necessary. 
 
Tests of fixed and random effects 
To understand the presence or absence of intercept individually for each section, F-statistic 
is used which is the zero hypothesis for equality of intercepts for different sections. If the 
H଴ hypothesis is rejected, there is no reason for uniform hypothesis of intercepts for each 
section. If the  H଴ hypothesis is rejected another question comes out that: Does the 
difference in intercepts of each section operate in a fixed way or random operators can 
better explain this difference? Usually these methods as applying Panel Data Method with 
Fixed or Random Effects are tested by Hausman Test which the rejection of zero 
hypothesis implies selection of fixed effects method and not rejection of zero hypothesis is 
the implication of choosing random effects method (Mohammadi and Mohammadzadeh, 
2009). 
 
 
Table 3. F-Limer and Hausman tests for each group 
 Democratic countries Non-Democratic countries 
Effects Test Statistic def. Prob. Statistic def. Prob. 
Cross-section F 395.587219 (10,143) 0.0000 1.930917 (4,53) 0.1188 
Cross-section Chi-
square 546.966469 10 0.0000 9.114787 4 0.1083 
Source: findings of research  
 
 
Table 4. Hausman test for Democratic countries 
 Democratic countries 
Effects Test Statistic def. Prob. 
Cross-section random 309.088002 9 0.0000 
Source: findings of research  
Since F-statistic and Hausman tests are indicating the rejection of H଴ hypothesis for 
democratic countries, selected method for estimation is fixed effects method; however, 
because of not rejection of H଴ hypothesis in F-limer test for non-democratic countries, the 
pooled data model will be used for estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Estimation results with OLS method 
 
Table 5. Results of OLS estimation 
Non-Democratic countries Democratic countries 
Prob. t-Statistic Coefficient Variable Prob. t-Statistic Coefficient Variable 
0.1088 -1.632421 -0.054252 LGOV 0.0158 2.445471 0.071552 LGOV 
0.0000 -6.523766 -0.006929 LFFC 0.0429 2.044574 0.014877 LFF 
0.0000 7.613701 0.008296 POLITY 0.0447 -2.026914 -0.050042 LFT 
0.0001 4.409842 0.008124 LOIL 0.5209 0.643754 0.002642 LOIL 
0.0000 -6.124245 -0.241670 LFF 0.0047 2.876512 0.020840 LFFC 
0.0000 11.56620 0.623699 LPOP 0.0009 3.397025 0.006019 LPOLITY 
0.0000 -7.903477 -0.083812 LFT 0.0055 -2.823727 -2.857418 LPOP 
0.0000 -8.918439 -0.142681 LRATE 0.0000 5.016431 0.158385 LRATE 
0.0000 -5.503698 -0.056687 LPT 0.0192 2.371003 0.044434 LPT 
0.0000 -35.51064 -0.455426 LGEO 0.0000 -12.15564 -0.015699 DU1 
0.0000 4.765011 0.291002 ISLAM 0.0000 10.47123 0.347968 LGEO 
    0.0000 -13.53198 -0.021825 ISLAM 
0.99 R-squared 0.99 R-squared 
1.54 Durbin-Watson stat 1.86 Durbin-Watson stat 
Source: findings of research 
 
Results of OLS estimation indicate that the size of government, the freedom from 
corruption, the freedom from tax, the property rights, the breadth of the country, and the 
real exchange rate have a positive effect in democratic countries and a negative effect in 
non-democratic countries on economic growth. Polity has a positive effect on economic 
growth in both groups of countries. Oil Proved Reserves does not impact growth in 
countries with high democracy; however, it has a positive effect in countries with low 
democracy. Religion and population have a negative effect in high democracy countries 
and a positive effect in low democracy countries on economic growth. The dummy 
variable has also a negative effect in democratic countries. Results reveal that when we 
estimate the model with OLS method, resource curse does not occur in any groups and Oil 
Proved Reserves has a positive effect on economic growth in non-democratic countries. 
 
Estimation results with TSLS method 
Growth models for oil-rich countries assume that oil revenue, which is correlated with the 
status of each country, varies over time. However economic growth depends on the 
breadth of the country (GEO, which is constant over the years) and its resources. Due to 
the variable, GEO or the breadth of the country, fixed effects method cannot estimate the 
model appropriately. GLS method would not also estimate coefficients in random effects 
method accurately (Mohammadi, 2013). Thus we estimate the mentioned model by TSLS 
method. We use education, employment and polity as instruments. Democracy affects 
economic growth both directly and indirectly through investment, inflation, population 
growth and income distribution. Democratic system accompanied by political stability 
secures private property rights including inventions, and strengthens fundamental linkages 
between political institutions and investors. Similarly, democracy provides social stability 
and improves income distribution in favor of the middle class and toilers and so augments 
the quality and quantity of education and human resources skills and this leads to 
economic growth increase. The positive effect of democracy on economic growth is 
largely through improved human resources education and skills. Income distribution 
   
improvement is due to the power transmission from wealthy class to middle class. 
Although in the short term democracy may increase consumption, reduce investment and 
economic slowdown, long-term sustainable economic development requires an equitable 
distribution of income. Helkman and Naak (2002) state in a democratic system, the 
government is obliged to respond to people and hence its decisions is accompanied by the 
majority vote of the people and thus the economic freedom will increase. 
There is also a bidirectional and reciprocal relationship between education and 
employment and economic growth. This means that by increasing the level of education, 
human capital and employment, economic growth will augment and mutually higher 
economic growth results in human capital and employment improvement.  
 
Table 6. TSLS estimation 
Non-Democratic countries Democratic countries 
Prob.  t-Statistic  Coefficient Variable Prob.  t-Statistic  Coefficient Variable 
0.0157 -2.547969 -0.546845 LGOV 0.6877 -0.403351 -0.032749 LGOV 
0.2363 1.206265 0.053914 LFFC 0.0001 4.221609 0.108810 LOIL 
0.0000 -5.059069 -0.046096 LOIL 0.0107 2.609982 0.421341 LFF 
0.0469 -2.064760 -0.456537 LPT 0.7657 -0.298918 -0.004540 LFT 
0.0000 -7.059618 -0.450442 LFT 0.0152 2.477073 0.038571 LFFC 
0.0025 3.269683 0.980161 LRATE 0.0005 3.624431 0.096709 LPT 
0.0000 17.21220 0.826280 LPOP 0.0000 6.761203 0.268887 LRATE 
0.0001 -4.534759 -1.527658 LFF 0.0002 3.935718 1.660249 LPOP 
0.0000 8.002996 5.120066 DU6 0.7924 0.263958 0.003082 ISLAM 
0.0351 -2.198109 -0.347527 DU5     
0.0002 4.224394 3.192958 ISLAM     
0.99  R-squared 0.99 R-squared 
1.79  Durbin-Watson stat 2  Durbin-Watson stat 
Source: findings of research 
TSLS estimation indicates trade freedom has a negative and significant effect on economic 
growth in low democracy countries; however, there is no significant relationship between 
them in high democracy countries. It can be safely said that Dutch disease effects are 
visible in nondemocratic countries which oil revenues are deteriorating terms of trade and 
causing Dutch disease. Population is positively related to economic growth in both groups 
therefore with the increase in population, economic growth will rise in these countries. 
This result is not consistent with previous studies. The size of government does not affect 
economic growth in democratic countries and it has a negative and significant effect on 
economic growth in non-democratic countries. Most government expenditures in low 
democracy countries spent on current expenses, as well as to suppress dissent and thus it 
reduces economic growth. Wagner Act also notes that with the increase in per capita 
income in an economic system, the relative size of the public sector will augment 
(Pajooyan, 2002). In some theories, the relationship between government spending and 
economic growth is investigated by the method of financing through tax and point to extra 
taxation load. Barro (1992) in endogenous growth model revealed in most cases, taxation 
causes a gap between private and social rates of return. The gap puts tax rate between net 
and gross rates of return on savings that reduces capital accumulation and thus leads to 
lower rates of economic growth. Theoretical foundations that explain the relationship 
between the size (and expenditure) of government and economic growth have been 
examined from two perspectives. In first viewpoint positive or negative effect of the size 
(expenditure) of government on economic growth have been reviewed and criticized, and 
   
the subject of the second approach is the optimal size. According to first viewpoint, there 
are two fundamental terms, a) a larger size of the government has a negative effect on 
economic growth. Government is inefficient. For example, undertaking public investments 
with high costs and also inefficient ownership in agriculture, industry, energy, banking and 
financial services, reduces opportunities for private sector investment. Thus a larger size 
of government has a negative effect on economic growth in long term. In addition funding 
the government through internal and external debts squeezes the private financial system 
and will take profitable investment opportunities for the private sector, b) government 
plays an important role in developing the countries and hence has a long-term positive 
effect on economic growth. This group believes government on guiding the economy 
towards the optimal development point holds a crucial and key role in conflicts that arise 
between private and public interests.  
According to the second viewpoint there is an optimal point for government expenditures. 
On this basis, government expenditures divided into two parts of productive and 
unproductive expenditure. Barro et al. (1991), Gaurteni et al. (1998) and Barro (1989) 
indicated the government is a major impediment to economic growth. Salai Martin (1997) 
showed there is a weak relationship between economic growth and the size of government. 
Keler et al. (1999) state expenditures such as education and construction costs of 
government increase economic growth; however, security and welfare costs do not affect 
economic growth. 
Freedom from corruption has a positive and significant effect on economic growth in both 
groups. The freedom from tax and property rights have a positive and significant effect on 
economic growth in democratic countries and a negative effect in non-democratic 
countries. Loson and Blak (1996) have two conditions for economic freedom: property 
rights, free operation and exchange. If there is economic freedom, people should know 
their legally acquisitions protected from encroachments of the others and be able to use or 
exchange it without trampling upon the rights of others. Property rights increase 
production incentives by producing private wealth prevent all the wealth of society to be a 
government monopoly. Property rights as well as the production of wealth, facilitate 
achieving political reconciliation, and implementing social arrangements. On the other 
hand free trade increases the efficiency of production, optimal allocation of resources, 
maximizing production level and ultimately produces maximum prosperity for the 
community. In low democracy countries because of the form of government, property 
rights is limited and also with regard to revenues from oil sales, tax revenues are limited, 
thus the levels of tax freedom and property rights are low and they do not have a positive 
effect on economic growth.  
Exchange rate has a positive and significant effect in both countries. With the increase in 
the exchange rate and reduced imports, terms of trade improve and economic growth will 
increase.  
Oil proved reserves has a positive effect in democratic countries and a negative effect in 
non-democratic countries on economic growth. Oil does not have negative and inhibiting 
effects on economic growth directly, but resource abundance often causes certain trends 
and distortions in economy and leads to economic backwardness. This result indicates that 
the resource curse phenomenon has occurred in countries with lower democracy. 
   
Religion (Islam) as a dummy variable has a positive effect on economic growth in both 
groups. In contrast to previous theories including Swife which considered Islam little 
attention to the wealth of the Muslims an obstacle to capital accumulation, and also Ernest 
Renan that states Islam is opposed to scientific advances and industrial progress and is in 
conflict with science and culture, we see that Islam does not have only a negative effect on 
economic growth, but also causes economic growth to increase. This result is consistent 
with that of Ross (2008). He knows oil as the main cause of arrears in oil-rich countries, 
not Islam. Dummy variables in Egypt and Gabon have respectively positive and negative 
effects on economic growth which indicates the internal conditions of these countries. 
 
Results 
Natural resources (and its income), not directly, but by different paths such as changes in 
production level, creating dependence on resource extraction sector, raising the real 
exchange rate, increased imports, and etc. can influence economic growth. This research 
investigated the effective economic growth determinants in oil-rich countries divided by 
the level of democracy into two groups: countries with low and high democracy. The 
results of the OLS method shows that in countries with high democracy government size, 
freedom from corruption, polity (democracy), the real exchange rate, freedom from tax, oil 
revenues, breadth of the country, and property rights, have a positive and significant effect 
on economic growth and oil proved reserves has no significant impact on economic 
growth in these countries. However population, economic freedom and religion have a 
negative effect on economic growth. 
In countries with low democracy the size of government, freedom from corruption, 
freedom from tax, real exchange rate, and property rights have a negative and significant 
effect on economic growth and polity, oil proved reserves, religion and population have a 
positive and significant effect on economic growth. Thus resource curse hypothesis is 
rejected by OLS method in both groups. However when we estimated the model by TSLS 
method and used employment, education and polity as instrument variables, the 
relationship between the variables and economic growth changed. The secondary model 
revealed in low democracy countries size of government, oil proved reserves, property 
rights, trade freedom, freedom from tax have a negative and significant effect on economic 
growth and freedom from corruption does not affect economic growth significantly. On 
the other hand religion, real exchange rate and population have a positive and significant 
effect on economic growth. 
In high democracy countries size of government, trade freedom and religion does not have 
any significant effect on economic growth; however, freedom from tax, freedom from 
corruption, real exchange rate, population, property rights and oil proved reserves have a 
positive and significant effect on economic growth. Therefore by TSLS estimation, 
resource curse hypothesis is approved in non-democratic countries and is rejected in 
democratic countries. 
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